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Our underlying assumption is that certain forces that are exogenous with regards to fertility are increasing the opportunities of women in the workforce. One mechanism may be technological change that favors human capital over physical labor (Galor and Weil, 1996) . Assuming that women are at a comparative disad vantage in physical labor, this gradual change will tend to increase relative wages for 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 multiplier effect (Maurin and Moschion, 2006) , may explain some of the increase in French fertility.
In contrast to the French experience, total fertility in Japan, Italy, and Ger many has continued to decline and in 2005 was down to 1.3 children per woman.
Italy decreased its federal subsidies per child from 1980 to 2000, while Germany increased subsidies per child 67 percent to $2,216 (Gatenio-Gabel and Kamerman, 2006) .
Convergence in Fertility Rates
The most striking fact about fertility rates across countries is the degree of absolute convergence. Regardless of income levels or income growth, countries around the world appear to be heading toward a total fertility rate of something less than 2 children per woman. We show this graphically in Figure 2 , using United The twentieth-century decrease in fertility in high-income countries is com monly associated with five major factors: 1) increases in the demand for human capital (Galor and Weil, 2000) , which increased the desire of parents to produce high-human-capital children; 2) increases in income which increased the oppor tunity cost of men's and women's time (Becker, 1981) ; 3) the long-run increase in women's labor force participation (Mira and Ahn, 2002; Brewster and Rindfuss, 2000) ; 4) declines in childhood mortality; and 5) the availability of easy-to-use and effective contraception for women (Goldin and Katz, 2000, 2002) .5 However, we argue that the changes brought about by the pill or associated with the first waves of women entering the work force en masse had largely played themselves out by the 1990s, and so these factors do little to explain the substantial cross-sectional differences in fertility across the high-income countries in the early twenty-first century.
Female Labor Force Participation and Fertility Rates
Higher female labor force participation is generally associated with lower fertility. For illustration, Figure 3 plots female labor force participation versus total fertility rates for 83 countries in 1995. The relationship is highly significant. A Mira and Ahn, 2002) . In 1970, high-income countries with low female labor force participation were also the ones with high fertility. The coeffi cient on this relationship in the 1970 sample is not significantly different than in the 83-country sample in Figure  3 . However, among high-income countries, this negative coefficient moves toward zero and becomes significantly different than the larger sample by 1980. By 1990, the coefficient in high-income countries between female labor force participation and fertility is not significantly different from zero.
By 2000, the high-income country relationship between fertility and female partic ipation is upward-sloping.6 Figure 4 shows the relationship between female partic ipation rates and fertility rates in high-income countries for 1995, the last year with 5 Galor (2005) argues from both empirical and theoretical grounds that the demand for human capital is a more plausible explanation for the demographic transition than a pure income effect or a childhood mortality effect. The association between women's labor force participation and fertility could work through an increase in the opportunity cost of women's time relative to men's if the gender gap is narrowing at the same time that women are entering the workforce (Galor and Weil, 1996) . 6 The relationship between fertility and female labor force participation for each of 1970, 1980, 1990, and 2000 is shown graphically in Appendix Figure Al , available on-line with this paper at (http://www. adult is asked who usually performs the following activities: 1) laundry, 2) caring for sick family members, 3) cleaning, 4) preparing meals. The possible responses in the raw data are 1) always me, 2) usually me, 3) about equal between me and my spouse, 4) usually my spouse, 5) always my spouse. We limit the sample to households with children under five and with both a man and woman present. We use the woman's responses and convert the raw data to the percentage done by the man, as assessed by the woman. We use the following recoding of the data: "always the woman" = 0 percent done by the man; "usually the woman" = 25 percent done by the man; "about equal" = 50 percent done by the man; "usually the man" = 75 percent done by the man; and "always the man" equals 100 percent done by the man. We then average the percent done by the man across the spend about 37 percent as much time as women doing child care; the same number for Italy is 39 percent.
In Table 1 , we further investigate the connection between men's housework/ child care and fertility. Column 1 of the table shows the regression coefficient from implies that a one-standard-deviation increase in men's share of housework/child care is associated with an increase in the fertility rate of 0.17 children. In the second column, we use as the independent variable the female labor force participation rate in the 30-35 age group. The coefficient is positive but not significant.
In the third column, we use per-child government spending on families as the independent variable. For these data, we use the OECD Social Expenditure (SOCX) 2007 database, which measures governmental social spending on a variety in-kind benefits, including childcare subsidies or state-provided child care. We convert these data from percent of GDP to dollars per child in year 2000 (purchas ing power parity) dollars. We use the log of spending per child under 15 as our right-hand-side variable. Column 3 of Table 1 shows that in a regression where log spending per child is the only regressor, a doubling of spending is associated with an increase in the fertility rate of 0.15 children, which is marginally significant, at the 10 percent level. This coefficient is consistent with the results of numerous (much more detailed) studies which find that pro-natalist policies work. For example, Bj?rklund (2006) with a .17 increase in the total fertility rate. This coefficient is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Types of Government Family Subsidies and Fertility
In Table 2 , we use the same OECD data to look more deeply at the effects of various forms of government family subsidies on fertility. We have data on the number of legally required weeks of paid maternity and paternity leave, as well as cient on cash subsidies is marginally significant. All three forms of pro-family government spending appear to be associated with higher fertility, but we can't distinguish among their effects.
In column 4, we separate from the "services" category publicly provided preschool and day care. "Publicly provided day care" has the largest coefficient (0.37) relative to the other categories, although this variable is significant only at the 10 percent level. A doubling of spending on day care (from 0.37 percent of GDP to 0.74) is associated with 0.13 more children per woman. We take this as some evidence that publicly provided day care may be an effective pro-natalist policy.
This finding is consistent with Blau and Robins (1989) and with Del Boca (2002), who finds large effects on fertility in Italy from increasing the availability of free day care for young children.
It may seem counterintuitive that modest levels of effort by men around the house, federal subsidies of a few thousand dollars per year, or even free day care can have a large effect on fertility, given that the time-related costs of raising a child remain very large. The financial costs of raising a child may be on the order of $11,600 per year (Lino, 2006) . It may be that intuition is misguided here, and individuals' fertility decisions are in fact very elastic with respect to cash subsidies and low-cost day care. However, there may also be peer effects or "social multipli ers" in couples' choices about number of children. It seems likely that people use their friends, family, and neighbors as a cue to decide how many children to have.
For example, Fernandez and Fogli (2005) Similarly, we have identified two indicators of the degree to which society shares the child-rearing burden with women: government spending on families (especially day care) and men's share of time spent on child care. Both of these indicators have a steep positive association with fertility and each appears to be trending upward in European countries. There has been a steady increase in men's share of child care throughout the high-income countries during the last 25 years.
Using the Multinational Time Use Survey, we compute the total hours per week of child care for own children produced by both men and women. We included all categories of child-related activities such as bathing children, cooking for children, caring for sick children, reading to children, and so on. We limit the samples to men and women ages 25-55 with children age five and under in the household. At the country level, we calculate the fraction of such hours supplied by women. Figure 6 shows the results for five countries. In the United States, for example, women were providing roughly 83 percent of the child care in 1975, falling to 62 percent by 2000. The time trend was similar in the United Kingdom, the Source: Data are from the Multinational Time Use Survey.
Note: We limit the sample to men and women 25-55 who have children under five in the household.
We calculate hours per week spent on child care for men and women, and we average at the country level to find the proportion of those hours that are reported by women.
In Italy in the 1990s, women were doing about 73 percent of the child care?about 10 percentage points more than U.S. women at the time. If Italian men were to increase their fraction of child care to the level of the U.S. men (and if we take our coefficients in Table 1 Fertility rates in the high-income countries of the world appear to be deter mined by an array of social processes that go beyond the effects of relative wages, 
